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  A VILLAGE WITH MY NAME

  A VILLAGE WITH MY NAME

  A Family History of China’s Opening to the World

  Scott Tong

  The University of Chicago Press

  Chicago and London

  The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

  The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London

  © 2017 by Scott Tong

  All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission, except in the case of brief quotations in critical articles and reviews. For more information, contact the University of Chicago Press, 1427 E. 60th St., Chicago, IL 60637.

  Published 2017

  Printed in the United States of America

  26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 1 2 3 4 5

  ISBN-13: 978-0-226-33886-6 (cloth)

  ISBN-13: 978-0-226-33905-4 (e-book)

  DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226339054.001.0001

  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Names: Tong, Scott, author.

  Title: A village with my name : a family history of China’s opening to the world / Scott Tong.

  Description: Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 2017. | Includes index.

  Identifiers: LCCN 2017017823| ISBN 9780226338866 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780226339054 (e-book)

  Subjects: LCSH: Tong family. | Families—China—History—20th century. | Chinese American families—History—20th century. | China—History—20th century.

  Classification: LCC CT1827.5.T66 T66 2017 | DDC 305.8951073—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017017823

  This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992 (Permanence of Paper).

  Contents

  Cast of Characters

  Preface

  PART 1 THE GREAT OPENING

  1 Secrets of the Tong Village

  2 Revenge of the Peasants from Tong East

  3 Foreign Exchange: Student Life, Tokyo Wife

  4 The Nanjing Glee Club and a Revolution for Girls

  5 Genealogies and Corrections: We Regret the Error

  6 The Communist Mole in the School

  PART 2 THE GREAT INTERRUPTION

  7 The Day the Japanese War Devils Came

  8 Lost and Found: Grandmother’s Voice on Cassette

  9 The Wartime Collaborator in Our Family

  10 From Prison to Mao’s Gulag

  11 The Brother Left Behind in the War

  12 Cursed by Overseas Relation

  PART 3 THE GREAT RESUMPTION

  13 My Cousin and His Shanghai Buick

  14 Lonely and Smothered: The Only Child

  15 Daughters for Sale

  Epilogue

  Sources

  The Characters

  TONG FAMILY (PATERNAL SIDE)

  Tong Zhenyong—great-grandfather

  His Chinese wife

  Arai Yamako—his Japanese wife

  Tong Tong—grandfather

  Wife 1

  Wife 2

  Wife 3

  Tong Guangde—former party secretary from the Tong village, from Tong East

  Tong Daren—third cousin in the Tong village, from Tong West

  Daughter Tong Yuqin

  Daughter Tong Yuhua

  Alvin Tong (also Tong Hu)—father

  Tong Bao—uncle and father’s younger half brother

  Wife Qi Menglan

  Son Tong Chengkan

  Brother Tong Qi

  Kathy Tong—aunt and father’s younger half sister (also Tong Qi)

  Pu Tong—aunt and father’s younger half sister

  Alice Tong—aunt and father’s younger half sister

  Tony Tong—older brother

  SUN FAMILY (MATERNAL SIDE)

  Carleton Sun (also Sun Yi, Sun Ditang, Sun Honglie)—grandfather

  Mildred Zhao (also Chao, Djao)—grandmother

  Lily Sun Hsu—aunt

  Constantine Sun (also Eddie Sun)—uncle

  Anna Sun (Tong)—mother (also Sun Ailian)

  Welthy Honsinger Fisher—Mildred’s teacher and correspondent

  Anna Melissa Graves—Mildred’s teacher and correspondent

  Sun Maozi—distant cousin in the Sun village

  Sun Peipei—distant cousin in Shanghai

  Cai Su—distant uncle in Shanghai

  Preface

  In the last weeks before returning to the states after a three-and-a-half-year work assignment in Shanghai, I became determined to make one last stop. To be specific, I wanted to visit a bank. Actually, to be more specific, I really only wanted to see its ceiling. This was an odd quest. Given the opportunity to report on the world’s most dynamic and confusing economy for the public radio business show Marketplace, I’d taken far more exciting rides across China.

  Typically they involved Chinese people rather than Chinese things. Two men in villages outside Xian in the remote western province of Shaanxi explained on tape how they’d been kidnapped and sold as slaves to brickmaking-kiln bosses—for less than a hundred dollars each. Mothers of children with lead poisoning from an illegal smelting furnace described the facility’s smokestack: it was so low the belched pollutants simply fell to the ground and leached into the soil and groundwater. A convicted baby seller mapped out for me his trafficking network, which included the orphanage where my own daughter lived. Still, I hankered for this ceiling.

  It had been added to my to-do list before moving back to the Washington, DC, suburbs, by my Marketplace bureau colleague Cecilia Chen. She’d heard me complain: I’d produced so many breaking news stories about Right-Now China—snapshots in time—that I shortchanged myself of the relevant history to contextualize what I’d been seeing. Sometimes you have to flip back in the album to try to understand the pictures you’re seeing now. And flip slowly. So much of mainland life amounts to an arms race: beat the competition, bargain for the best price, stuff more knowledge into your kid than what the neighbor’s has, hustle into the elevator and jab DOOR CLOSE before the next person can nose her way in. “If you’re in a car waiting at a red light, you have to start driving before it turns green,” my Shanghai friend John Lu advised me the first time we met. “Otherwise you never make it through.” Without realizing it, I’d joined this race myself, and I needed to stop running and look around.

  This building is likely familiar to you if you’ve visited Shanghai. It’s the signature dome on the Bund, the historic skyline along the west bank of the Huangpu River. You can’t miss it from the famous Pearl Tower, or one of the trophy skyscrapers across the river in Pudong. For my money, the best view of the domed structure comes from the deck of a budget river ferry, which at forty cents a person at the time was the best family deal in town. The building once housed the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, and now belongs to a Chinese state bank.

  On a baking summer day in 2010, I emerged from the Line 2 subway at Nanjing East Road and walked through the oldest part of town. Its narrow streets and world-beating traffic always bring to mind Lower Manhattan. At the waterfront, I took a right and minutes later entered the bank. Heeding Cecilia’s advice, I walked with purpose to the center of the ornate marble lobby and looked up.

  Before I could even reach for my camera, a security guard sidled up. “No pictures.” Okay. And then I saw them: brilliant mosaic frescoes, each forming one side of an octagon surrounding the dome. Every tiled mural dates back to the 1920s and is an artistic rendering of a skyline from somewhere in the world. Each stands for a bank branch from a past golden age of globalization a century ago: Shanghai, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Calcutta, New York, London, Bangkok, and Paris. The Eight Seas, I said to myself. In the foreground of each city landscape is a protective Western god
or goddess; the Statue of Liberty stands guard before the Manhattan skyline, for instance. Further up, in the center of the dome, is a mosaic of sun and moon goddesses, all with Caucasian faces—a Western-style masterpiece that might belong in Rome or Istanbul rather than Shanghai.

  This captivated me, and then it puzzled me. These images hearken back to Shanghai’s bad old days of colonial oppression and humiliation, at least in the party’s telling of history (which, for most mainlanders, remains the only version). They represent a time when white men in gunboats shot their way into China and snatched up the best sections of port cities to build mansions, trading houses, bars, and racetracks. This is a shameful past, in a culture with no market for shame. How had this all survived Mao Zedong’s closed-door, xenophobic regime of the 1950s and ’60s, so adept at photoshopping China’s past? Why was the art still up there? Before I could linger on this question, the guard returned to nudge me on my way. Transaction over.

  I’d later learn the preservation story behind these frescoes. In the 1950s, after the party took over the building—and the country—to house the headquarters of the new Shanghai city government, the dome artwork was plastered over. But it was not destroyed. In one telling of the story, comrades sought to chisel off the mosaic tiles, but an enterprising architect suggested it’d be easier to just cover them. The masterpiece remained hidden underneath for four decades, until its discovery by renovators in the 1990s. Under new ownership, the Eight Seas were polished off and redisplayed for a new reform era. It had become okay for China to look outward again.

  Globalization drifts in and out of fashion, often quickly and without warning. As I write this in early 2017, we are living in quite a moment here. The modern connected age of open borders and markets is being vilified in ways I’ve not seen in my adult life. Raising drawbridges appears on the ballot wherever I look, and in the States, the handy new epithet is “globalist.” Where this all leads is impossible to know, and in any event I’m not in the predicting business (there are books and investment advisors for that kind of thing). But one thing is clear: much of the angst, ambivalence, and outright hostility toward today’s interlinked world has to do with China.

  Without question, the mainland has benefited from global interconnections, paradoxically because its workers have been poor for so long and thus willing to work for what you and I consider peanuts. It seems to have happened quickly. China frequently is cast as a newcomer powerhouse to the top division, emerging out of nowhere. You know the framing of Instant China: Mao dies in the mid-1970s, Deng Xiaoping takes over soon after, and the story starts there. Anything relevant is After Deng, AD.

  Instant China makes for snappy, compelling stories. If you’re reading this, there’s a reasonable chance that you, like me, have parachuted into the mainland for a few days and heard a memorable life story of a cabbie, bond trader, or grubby dumpling seller. That person’s fortunes turned dramatically after Deng’s policy reforms, known as “reform and opening,” or gaige kaifang. Well-intended mainlanders can gaige kaifang you into submission: Gaige kaifang delivered economic and geographic mobility. It allowed for private property, for nobodies to open vegetable stalls and electronic workshops. Gaige kaifang brought meat to the table. The implication is, whatever preceded gaige kaifang was a lengthy period of numbing suffering that amounts to China’s Old Testament: famines, pestilence, floods, wars, colonialism, political witch-hunts, bound feet, and hyperinflation. The fall before the gaige kaifang redemption.

  It’s a very clean story I myself told at times on the radio. My first big profile story in 2005 was of a poor, barely literate farmer in the western province of Sichuan. Mr. Xu, a sinewy man with a deep outdoor laborer’s tan and a crewcut, hailed from the village of Guang’an, the home of Deng Xiaoping. He sought his fortunes in the metropolis of Chongqing, finding grunt work as a porter; he roped people’s goods and boxes to a bamboo stick slung across his shoulders, carrying them to the appointed destination for a negotiated fee. Part human, part mule. He slept in a drafty group house in a shantytown, on the bottom level of a barracks-style bunk bed for twenty. I joined him on a return trip home to his village. Suddenly, Mr. Xu transformed into Big Man on Campus, the self-made tale of a village boy who went to the big city and made good. Mr. Xu used his savings to build the tallest house in the village. Stopping at a neighbor’s house for lunch, he caught me admiring a gigantic wok in the kitchen, perhaps four feet across. Mr. Xu pointed at it and declared: “Mine’s bigger.”

  This telling serves multiple constituencies. For the ruling Communist Party in desperate search of legitimacy, it undergirds the essential founding myth that an economic miracle occurred on its watch. For international reporters, it provides a clean narrative to make sense of a big, chaotic place. But I am not so sure now. It’s like taking a snapshot of a flower with a closeup fish-eye lens, blurring the background. The picture is devoid of context.

  There is a phrase that captures this context-less view of China, a phrase I’ve appropriated from a global banker and author named Graham Jeal: skyscraper syndrome. Wowed by a masculine high-rise, trophy bullet train, nineteen-course feast, or airport auto-flush toilet, an observer looks at China and vacates rational thought. He or she moves on to a series of regrettable business or personal decisions, and returns home convinced the mainland has taken a controlling stake in the universe. China is, well, different. Eventually for those who stay, the fog begins to lift. The toilets in the trophy high-rises aren’t fixed quite right. The buildings stay vacant, and the workers inside underperform. A more nuanced picture starts to come into view.

  At this moment in time, it’s worth looking at China and its place in the world with fresh eyes. A Village with My Name is my own pursuit of a useful historical perspective, a project that began after I returned to the United States in 2010. It’s a tricky undertaking, given there is so much history to consider. “The Chinese people have five thousand years of history,” one of my first Mandarin teachers lectured to me in 1980—a line that has been repeated to me five thousand times since. But how can a new story about China be so very old? How relevant is all that mind-numbing history of emperors and dynasties to today? Where did today’s China really come from?

  My suggestion here—which, to be honest, reflects the thinking of many intellectual historians—is that critical roots go back to a prior heyday of globalization: the century before World War I. Going back at least to the nineteenth century, self-interested Chinese (and foreign) nationals took the seeds of modernity and sprinkled them on mainland soil. As it turns out, some of these first movers are on my family tree. If you know anything about China’s recent past, you know that only some people were rewarded for looking outward. Others paid a heavy price when political winds changed and a newly xenophobic China slammed its doors to the world.

  The upshot of that decision was to delay progress. Fundamentally, China’s is a story of coming late to modernity. Many Chinese have told me: We came late to the industrial revolution, late to the digital revolution. We are not going to miss the next one.

  This book exists in three parts. Part 1 is what I call the Great Opening. My paternal great-grandfather Tong Zhenyong was an early member of the scholar class to get out of the backwater Tong ancestral village along the Grand Canal. He made his way to Tokyo, studying politics and economics, dabbling in politics with radical Chinese revolutionaries, and marrying a Japanese wife (this apparently came as a great surprise to his Chinese wife upon his return). Maternal grandmother Mildred Zhao attended a boarding school in Nowhere, China, run by American missionary women. There she first dreamed of studying in the United States. She had her feet unbound, learned English and piano, and rose to become lead accompanist to the Nanchang Glee Club. American books and plays and ideas were all around her, until the political winds shifted.

  Part 2 is the Great Interruption. Foreign connections became frowned upon, and Mildred and her husband, my grandfather Carleton Sun, were accused by cousins as “dressing too Wester
n.” Mildred fled when the Communists came. Carleton was arrested. Uncle Tong Bao on the other side of my family is a tale of two stories in one. Abandoned by his father and brother (my father) in wartime, he suffered for the anti-Communist political sins of his father, and then redeemed himself in the reform era, thanks to a top-shelf university education and a gig at a Black & Decker power tool plant.

  Part 3: the Great Resumption. Uncle Tong Bao’s son, my first cousin Tong Chengkan, works at a General Motors assembly plant and proudly drives a Buick, though in modern Shanghai he fears he can never afford a home. Or a spouse. The reform era has sparked an economic arms race, and so much money sloshing around in the system has tempted well-connected officials to bend the rules and take a cut, no matter the human implications. My wife and I adopted our daughter, Guo Shanzhen, from an orphanage we later learned was near the center of an international baby-selling trade—American dollars chasing Chinese baby girls. This book seeks to take a long view of how China opened up to the outside world, told through the lives of five people across five generations on my family tree.

  At the outset of this project, I did what reporters do reflexively: hunt for books and experts. I read the Chinese history tomes on my shelf that I’d pledged to read in Shanghai but never got around to. I looked up scholars in Wuhan, Pittsburgh, and Ann Arbor.

  Quickly, I stumbled onto a history fight, a debate this history minor from a long time ago should have remembered. To simplify ridiculously, there are two competing ways to understand change over time: the dominant “rupture” camp focuses on big turning points: the French Revolution and Enlightenment. The steam engine. Presidents and generals. Gaige kaifang.

  In the opposing corner sit scholars who see change through gradual evolution. They are adherents of “continuity.” As they see it, the Big Men in Time like Newton and Copernicus and Galileo cashed in on key moments, but their revolutions were built on earlier, incremental advances from the Middle Ages. Change builds on change. Things go further back. In the case of China, the argument is that the Communist era was less a beginning than an interruption in a longer process of opening up. What emerges from the continuity school is an under-told story of China: of a civilization and a people linked to an earlier, discredited age of globalization.